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In 1999 US Congress passed the National Air Quality and Telecommuting Act. This Act established pilot 
telecommuting programs (ecommute) in five major US metropolitan areas with the purpose of studying the 
feasibility of addressing air quality concerns through telecommuting. The major goal of the ecommute program 
was to examine whether a particular type of economic incentive, tradable emissions credits from telecommuting, 
represents a viable strategy for reducing vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and improving air quality. Under the 
ecommute program, companies could generate emissions credits by reducing the VMT of their workforce through 
telework programs. They would then be able to sell the credits to firms that needed the reductions to comply with 
air quality regulations. 
 
The paper provides analysis of the results of the ecommute program. First, we establish some context for 
evaluating whether the envisioned trading scheme represents a feasible approach to reducing mobile source 
emissions and promoting telecommuting and review the limited experience with mobile source emissions trading 
programs. We find that from a regulatory perspective, the most substantial drawback to such a program is its 
questionable environmental integrity, resulting from difficulties in designing sufficiently rigorous quantification 
protocols to accurately measure the emissions reductions from telecommuting. And perhaps more importantly, 
such a program is not likely to be cost-effective since the emissions reductions from a single telecommuter are 
very small. 
 
The paper also presents the first analysis of data collected from the ecommute program. Using two-and-one-half 
years of data, we look at telecommuting frequency, mode choice, and emissions reductions as well as at reporting 
behavior and dropout rates. Finally, we use the program's emissions reductions findings to calculate how much 
telecommuting would be needed to reach an annual volatile organic compounds emission reduction target in each 
city.  
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  Although the concept of telecommuting has been around since the 1970s, only in the middle of 
the 1990s has it become a part of everyday life. With arrival of broadband connection, the idea of 
remote work has become much more operational. Yet, even the most optimistic accounts of the current 
scale of telework have left its proponents at a loss. The “fathers” of telecommuting predicted that by the 
year 2000, 50% of US workers would be telecommuting
1, yet only a small fraction actually does. While 
many companies implement telecommuting programs for their employees because such programs allow 
them to reduce turnover, increase productivity and cut down on energy and even real estate costs, many 
workers enjoy increased flexibility and travel time and cost savings. At the same time, it is be now clear 
that telecommuting is not for everybody, and not only because of the nature of some jobs. 
Telecommuting tends to increase management costs for employers and could deprive workers of social 
interaction with co-workers and even negatively affect their careers.  
Because of these costs and because telecommuting can provide social benefits in the form of 
reduced traffic congestion and emissions, it might make sense for the government to provide incentives 
to telecommute. In the 1980s and 90s, the only significant incentive government agencies provided were 
telecommuting education and training offered by many US states. Also, some states had telecommuting 
programs for state employees that were supposed to serve as examples to be followed by other 
employers in the states. However, as time went by, telecommuting approached a saturation point – while 
most employers and employees have become familiar with telecommuting, only a small percent of the 
US workforce actually works remotely, and that percentage is stagnant.  
Only a few states provide financial incentives for telecommuters. The Oregon Department of 
Energy has been offering firms that employ telecommuters tax credits. More recently, some other states 
have made moves in the same direction. Georgia, New Jersey and Virginia are already providing or 
seriously considering financial incentives to employers of telecommuters
2. 
In 2000 such an incentive was proposed at the Federal level. Sen. Rick Santorum's bill, the 
Telework Tax Incentive Act, offered to provide a $500 tax credit for every worker who telecommutes at 
least 75 days per year. The credit was supposed to go to the party that pays for setting up the home 
office -- either the employee or employer. However, government agencies at all levels are so far 
reluctant to provide significant incentives to encourage more telecommuting. In the meantime, recent 
interest has arisen in telecommuting’s potential to reduce emissions. Many metro areas include some 
emissions reductions from telecommuting in their state implementation plans (SIPs).  
The ecommute program started with “National Telecommuting and Air Quality Act”, signed 
into law in 1999. The Act started a pilot program supported by the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). According to the legislation, the purpose of the 
ecommute program was to develop and evaluate methods for calculating reductions in emissions due to 
telecommuting. Then, as a part of the pilot project, employers who encouraged their workers to 
telecommute, were supposed to receive credits reflecting the amount of achieved emissions reductions. 
The received credits were supposed to be traded with the firms that, for the purposes of compliance with 
the Clean Air Act, would like to purchase such credits. The ecommute pilot program was to be carried 
out in 5 pilot cities – Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Houston, Chicago, and Washington, DC. The pilot 
program was supposed to test and evaluate the emissions credit mechanism to award telecommuting 
efforts
3. 
An obvious advantage of this program compared to explicit financial incentives – tax credits,   
subsidies, etc. – is that the government entity does not need to allocate budget funds to reward 
                                                 
1 See J, Nilles et al. (1976) 
2 University of South Florida Telecommuting Clearinghouse www.nctr.usf.edu/clearinghouse/statestatutes.htm 
3 However, due to a lack of regulatory basis, emissions trading mechanism has not been implemented in the course 
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employers encouraging telecommuting; employers are supposed to be able to trade emissions credits on 
the relevant market. The major purpose of the program was to evaluate and to sharpen the mechanisms 
that can be used later at the national scale. 
  In this paper, we describe the results of the program, discuss the institutional and regulatory 
background to emissions trading and the challenges of using telecommuting for emissions trading 
purposes. 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief review of the 
literature on telecommuting from the trip and emissions reduction perspective. Section 3 outlines the 
regulatory and institutional framework for emissions trading. In section 4 we outline the structure of the 
ecommute program and describe the data collection process. In section 5 we present the results, 
quantitative as well as qualitative, of the ecommute program. Section 6 concludes and discusses possible 
future directions of policy and research. 
 
2. Literature review 
  The literature on telecommuting has covered an array of topics– practical as well as theoretical 
issues, benefits and costs for both employees and employers, the impact of telecommuting on business 
structure and even the relationship between telecommuting and family relations. However, in this paper 
we will limit our literature review to the possible trip and emission reductions due to telecommuting. 
Because telecommuting has the potential to reduce vehicle trips, VMT, and thus emissions of various 
pollutants, there have been several studies that have tried to quantify these benefits.   
We review six studies here that have this as their focus
4. An early paper by Kitamura, Pendyala, 
and Goulias (1991) analyzes before and after behavior of 219 State of California employees who 
telecommute.  Three studies by Mokhtarian and coauthors rely on travel diaries in which workers filled 
out detailed information about their commute and non-commute travel patterns, and they include 
telecommuters who use telework centers as well as those who work from home.  Unfortunately, 
however, the studies have very small sample sizes.  Choo, Mokhtarian, and Salomon (2003) take the 
unusual approach of looking at aggregate time-series data on VMT and telecommuting, thus their study 
lends a new perspective to the issue.  Finally, a recent working paper by Collantes and Mokhtarian 
(2003) looks at VMT and PMT (person-miles-traveled) of telecommuters and non-telecommuters in a 
California sample over time, focusing on the links between residential location, VMT, and 
telecommuting.  We review each of these studies in turn.  
Kitamura, Pendyala, and Goulias (1991) is one of the earliest studies to use travel diary 
information. It gathered such data from participants in the State of California telecommuting study in 
the late 1980s.  Employees and their household members filled out travel diaries before and after they 
started telecommuting; the sample includes a control group – also state government employees and their 
household members – who did not telecommute.  The authors find that before the program began, those 
employees who eventually chose to telecommute made about the same number of trips per day as their 
counterparts who did not telecommute.  Household members from the two groups also made about the 
same number of trips per day.
5  Once they begin telecommuting, however, those employees make far 
fewer trips per day than the control group – an average of 1.94 versus 3.95 trips/day.  Household 
members also made fewer trips per day, though the difference was smaller – 3.08 versus 3.30 trips/day.  
Kitamura et al. find that, contrary to their expectations, there was no increase in non-commute trips by 
telecommuters. Most of the reduction in trips occurs during peak periods.  The authors found that 
                                                 
4 Here we discuss only empirical studies by recognized experts in the field. Due to space limitations, we omit 
analyses of the data outside of the US, theoretical papers, and do not cover other demand management strategies 
for reducing travel. 
5 The employees who ended up telecommuting and their household members actually made slightly fewer trips per 
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telecommuters made 73% fewer morning-peak departures after they began telecommuting and 54% 
fewer afternoon-peak departures. 
The reduction in number of daily trips translates into a reduction in VMT as well.  The average 
distances traveled per day by those employees who signed up for telecommuting dropped from 53.7 
miles to 13.2 miles on telecommuting days.  Compared to non-telecommuters, telecommuters are found 
to drive more miles per day, on average, when they are not telecommuting – 56 versus 45 miles.  This is 
consistent with the findings in many other studies that suggest that people with longer commutes tend to 
be the ones who participate in telecommuting programs. 
Finally, the Kitamura et al. study also looked at the mode choice of telecommuters and non-
telecommuters. The percentage of total trips made per day that are car trips increases for the 
telecommuting employees once they begin telecommuting but holds the same over time for the control 
group – telecommuting employees’ share of daily trips made by car rises from 81% to 91% when they 
start telecommuting. 
Koenig, Henderson, and Mokhtarian (1996) look at home-based telecommuters who 
participated in the State of California Telecommuting Pilot Project in the early 1990s.  All individuals in 
the sample worked for the state government and filled out travel diaries before and one year after they 
began telecommuting.  The study analyzed 40 people who chose to telecommute at home and 58 who 
didn’t telecommute at all – i.e., a control group.  The authors find that the people who telecommuted 
reduced the average number of daily vehicle-trips they took by 27% and reduced average VMT by 77%.  
Using California’s EMFAC7 emissions model, the authors calculate that these reductions in driving 
resulted in substantial emissions reductions:  48% in total organic gases, 64% in carbon monoxide, 69% 
in NOx, and 78% in particulate matter. Comparing the telecommuters to the control group, the authors 
find that telecommuters, prior to joining the telecommuting program, averaged higher total VMT than 
non-telecommuters.  This result appears to be due to higher non-commute VMT for this group, as 
telecommuters reported lower commute VMT than non-telecommuters.  Most studies find that 
telecommuters have longer average commutes thus the participants in this study appear to differ from 
those in other studies. 
Mokhtarian and Varma (1998) use data from another California telecommuting program, the 
Neighborhood Telecenters Project, which focused on the effectiveness of telework centers in reducing 
VMT and emissions.  The Project established 15 centers and, as in the previous study, participants and a 
control group of nonparticipants filled out travel diaries, both before and after the telecommuting 
program began. For this analysis, however, the authors found that the sample size quickly became too 
small if they tried to analyze both groups before and after, thus the study focuses only on the telecenter 
users and compares travel on days on which they use the center to days on which they do their regular 
commute to work.  The final sample included 72 people.  They find that total VMT is 53% lower on 
telecommuting days than on non-telecommuting days, but the number of trips increased.  This is 
because people apparently drive home for lunch from the telecenter.  The authors use the EMFAC7 
emissions model and find that emissions on telecommuting days are lower than those on non-
telecommuting days by 15% (ROG), 21.5% (CO), 35% (NOx), and 51.5% (PM). 
Henderson and Mokhtarian (1996) also focus on telecenters.  Their data are from the Puget 
Sound Telecommuting Demonstration Project sponsored by the Washington State Energy Office in 
1990-91.  The sample in this study includes 71 telecommuters – 8 center-based and 63 home-based – 
and 33 non-telecommuters.  The individuals worked for both government and private companies and as 
in the other studies, extensive travel diaries were kept on all commute and non-commute travel.   
Henderson and Mokhtarian find that total VMT for telecenter users dropped by nearly 54% on days on 
which they used the telecenters compared with non-telecenter days.  By comparison, home-based 
telecommuters reduced their VMT by 66.5% by working at home.  The telecenter users had the highest 
total daily VMT of the three groups, prior to the start of the telecommuting program, 91% greater than 
the control group.  Home-based telecommuters had daily VMT 54% greater than the control group.  
Again in this study, emissions reductions are calculated.  All pollutants are reduced, but NOx and PM 
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Choo, Mokhtarian, and Salomon (2003) take a very different approach to looking at the VMT 
impacts of telecommuting. They use national aggregate data to estimate an econometric time-series 
model of VMT as a function of economic variables; they then use the residuals from that regression – 
i.e., the unexplained part of annual aggregate VMT – and regress them on telecommuting data. In the 
first stage regression, the authors include as explanatory variables GDP per capita, the price of gasoline, 
average miles per gallon of the vehicle fleet, a consumer price index (CPI) for all commodities and a 
CPI for transportation.  They have 33 years of annual data, from 1966 to 1999, and their dependent 
variable is VMT per capita.
6 In the second stage, in which the authors estimate the first-stage residuals 
as a function of a constant term and the natural log of the number of telecommuters, results show the 
coefficient on the telecommuters variable as negative and significant.
7 The size of the estimated 
coefficient suggests that VMT during the sample period would have been approximately 2.12% higher 
than observed VMT in the absence of any telecommuting.  The range across all the different VMT 
models estimated is 1.78% to 3.31%. 
The Choo, Mokhtarian, and Salomon study is interesting for its unique approach to estimating 
the VMT effects of telecommuting but the aggregate data and simple version of the VMT model leave 
much unexplained.  The residuals from the first-stage VMT model are likely to include quite a number 
of omitted variables, thus the telecommuting variable in the second-stage regression could be proxying 
for a number of other factors that affect VMT. 
In a recent working paper, Collantes and Mokhtarian (2003) analyze data from 218 employees 
of the state of California.  The survey of these employees, completed in 1998, included retrospective 
responses to questions about telecommuting frequency, commute distances, residential relocations and 
job relocations for a 10-year period, 1988-1998, on a quarter-by-quarter basis.  The point of the survey 
is to obtain some information on the relationship between travel behavior, telecommuting, and 
residential location decisions. In this paper, the authors do not econometrically model telecommuting 
choice or frequency or location decisions.  They do, however, look at patterns of telecommuting over 
time and distances commuted and calculate total VMT and PMT for telecommuters and non-
telecommuters.
8   
The authors find that average commute lengths, which have increased over the 10-year period, 
are generally longer for telecommuters than non-telecommuters and that the difference between the two 
has increased over time. The authors speculate that two processes could be at work to cause these 
results: (1) relocations made for a variety of reasons could lead to longer commutes thus prompting 
more telecommuting, and/or (2) increased availability of telecommuting might cause people to relocate 
farther from their jobs.  The authors try to use their data to separate out these two possibilities.  The 
second scenario – the availability of telecommuting leading people to move farther from their jobs – 
does not appear to hold.  Current and former telecommuters in the dataset have shorter commutes, on 
average, after a move while nontelecommuters have longer ones.  The longer distance moves tend to be 
those that take place before telecommuting begins.  The authors claim that this suggests that 
telecommuting is a consequence of a move rather than the cause of it.  When survey respondents were 
asked what factors were important in their three most recent moves, telecommuting was only listed at all 
in 12 of 97 cases and even in these, it was not listed as an important factor. 
In terms of frequency of telecommuting, the data in this study shows that people telecommute, 
on average, approximately 1.5 times/week.  This average has fallen over time, according to the survey 
responses, and the authors explore different possible explanations for this decline.  The most likely 
reason, according to the authors, has to do with the fact that the early adopters of telecommuting are 
                                                 
6 They estimate three versions of a VMT model and five versions of a VMT per capita model.  The model we 
describe here is the one that they feel provides the best overall results. 
7 Regardless of the first-stage model used, the telecommuters variable is always significant in the second-stage 
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those people who do it most often.  The workers who adopt later are thus pulling down the average in 
the later years. 
Combining the commute length with the frequency with which the commute is made leads to an 
estimate of commute PMT.  Average PMT has increased slightly over time, for both telecommuters and 
non-telecommuters.  This is a result of longer commutes.  Non-telecommuters have higher average PMT 
than telecommuters but the difference declines in the later part of the sample period until the final three 
quarters when PMT is the same for the two groups. The same trends hold for VMT, but the difference 
between VMT for telecommuters and non-telecommuters is greater than the difference between PMT 
for the two groups.  The authors look at VMT for respondents who reported “drove alone” as their 
commute mode and also at VMT for respondents who reported any commute mode that included use of 
a personal vehicle.  Trends are the same for both measures of VMT. 
Unfortunately, the study does not include travel diaries so there is no measure of driving other 
than for commute purposes.  Also, drawing conclusions on data based on survey respondents’ memories 
of their commute modes, distances, times traveled, and telecommuting behavior for each quarter up to 
ten years ago is likely to be problematic.  The attempt to obtain a time series of telecommuting and other 
data is laudable since no other study, to our knowledge, includes such information, but it would be 
better to survey workers contemporaneously over a period of time rather than rely on memories.
9  
  Overall, the studies support the hypothesis that telecommuting reduces VMT and emissions. 
However, there is very little evidence to address the question by how much. However, for the purposes 
of quantification of the telecommuting emissions credit, this is a critical question. Unfortunately, in 
order to accurately quantify travel and emissions reductions, one needs data from detailed travel diaries 
or from a complete record of motorist’s movements. To the best of our knowledge, such data have not 
yet been applied to studies of telecommuting behavior. 
3. Regulatory and institutional framework for mobile source emissions trading 
We begin by briefly discussing the past US experience with emissions trading in general, and 
with emissions trading of mobile sources in particular. As evident from the description below, since 
government regulation is a prerequisite for the market of emissions, a clear regulatory framework is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition of emissions trading success.  
3.1. Introduction to Emissions Trading  
Emissions trading is a fairly simple concept, even though in practice many complexities arise. 
Because firms differ in their ability to reduce pollution, there are potential benefits from specialization 
through gains from trade. Instead of forcing high-cost firms to reduce emissions by some fixed amount 
or to install expensive technology, it is more cost-effective to allow them to purchase needed reductions 
from those who can reduce emissions cheaply. By improving the allocation of costs, emissions trading 
should enable a given environmental goal to be achieved at a lower total cost to society. In theory, the 
efficient outcome will occur when the marginal cost of abatement is equalized across polluters. 
  The intellectual origins of emissions trading date back to Coase’s (1960) argument for assigning 
transferable property rights for “bads,” such as pollution. The explicit application of this approach to 
environmental policy was developed separately by Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968). An advantage of 
emissions trading is that it frees the regulator from the substantial informational requirements associated 
with command-and-control regulation or a system of pollution fees. The value of the emissions rights is 
determined through the market rather than by a centralized authority, and the regulatory agency can 
simply set the desired emissions target without reference to the various firms’ abatement cost functions 
or pollution damage functions. 
                                                 
9 This is one virtue of the pilot Ecommute program.  See section  5 of this paper and  Walls and Nelson (2004) for 
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  The direct benefits of emissions trading arise from the lower total costs of compliance. Trading 
per se does not reduce aggregate emissions; those remain a function of goals or standards set by 
regulation. However, indirect environmental benefits can result from trading. The federal emissions 
offset program, for example, requires maintaining “trading ratios” so that firms must in effect purchase 
“extra” emissions reductions to achieve compliance. In addition, credits and allowances can be retired—
that is, purchased by or donated to an entity (often an environmental group) that opts not to use them to 
comply with regulations. Finally, if a trading program lowers the costs of regulation, the government 
may be able to set more aggressive environmental targets than would otherwise be the case.  
In the United States, two basic types of interfirm trading regimes are currently used in air pollution 
policy: allowance-based cap and trade and emissions reduction credit trading. Emission credits are 
generally used in two types of programs:  emissions offset and open-market trading programs. 
3.2. Allowance-Based Cap and Trade 
In a cap-and-trade system, an overall limit is placed on aggregate emissions during a specified 
compliance period. Emissions allowances that entitle the holder to emit a set amount of a pollutant are 
allocated to firms, with the total number of allowances set equal to the cap.
10 Allowances may be traded 
among eligible sources, but at the end of the compliance period, each firm must hold sufficient 
allowances to cover its emissions for the period. Usually, there are provisions for limited banking of 
allowances for later use. The attraction of a cap-and-trade system is that it retains the certainty of a hard 
target through the cap on total emissions while allowing firms flexibility in reaching the target. 
The flagship cap-and-trade program is the SO2 allowance market created under Title IV of the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The program, designed to reduce emissions that lead to acid rain, 
caps annual SO2 emissions from electric utilities’ generation facilities at 8.95 million tons 
(approximately 50% of 1980 levels). Firms possessing surplus allowances may either sell them or bank 
them for future compliance needs. The program is widely considered a major success. A review of 
published estimates reveals a general consensus that the SO2 trading system has resulted in, and will 
continue to account for, substantial cost savings over a command-and-control regime (Burtraw and 
Palmer 2003).  
The program’s success is attributed to many factors, but foremost among these is the flexibility 
it allows in compliance options and the timing of reductions. The fact that the regulation does not 
mandate a specific technological approach has enabled firms to take advantage of alternative ways of 
reducing emissions, such as using low-sulfur coal from Montana and Wyoming (made more available 
through rail deregulation). The program is also credited with spurring more process innovation than 
would have occurred under mandated technology standards. 
Besides SO2 allowance trading, other prominent examples of cap and trade include programs to 
control regional emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) in the Northeastern US and state programs in 
California, Illinois, and Texas.  
In 2005, the European Union will inaugurate a highly ambitious cap-and-trade program 
covering CO2 and other greenhouse gases.
11 In the United States, there are competing proposals to 
extend cap and trade for further SO2 reductions and the national regulation of NOx. Several northeastern 
states have NOx and carbon cap-and-trade programs that are slated to begin in the next few years. The 
cap-and-trade approach has also been proposed for addressing mercury emissions and CO2 in the US at 
the national level.  
3.3. Emissions Reduction Credit Trading 
  Unlike cap-and-trade programs, in which the emissions cap establishes the level of pollution 
allowed by the polluting industry, emissions reduction credit programs rely on other regulatory policies, 
                                                 
10 The number of allowances equals the emissions cap if 1 allowance is equal to 1 ton of emissions, as is often the 
case (as in the SO2 program), but any fixed ratio between emissions and allowances is acceptable. 
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such as rate-based emissions standards, to establish a baseline level of pollution. Credits are generated 
when firms reduce emissions below this baseline. The credits can then be used for other compliance 
purposes, such as offsetting pollution from a new source, dealing with penalties, or avoiding 
requirements to install reasonably available control technology (RACT). In the United States, there are 
two major types of emissions credit programs: offset programs, which are used for compliance with the 
Clean Air Act requirements for new large stationary sources in nonattainment areas; and open market 
programs, adopted by some states to give firms flexibility in complying with certain state and federal 
regulations. Offset programs primarily use emissions reduction credits (ERCs), which are denoted in a 
mass of emissions per unit of time (e.g., tons of NOx per year). In contrast, open-market programs use 
discrete emissions reduction (DER) credits. These are mass-based (e.g., tons of NOx) and are usually 
generated from a one-off emissions reduction.  
Emission reductions may be converted to ERCs or DERs if certain criteria are met. These 
criteria have been set out in a series of EPA guidance documents dating back to the 1980s. Specifically, 
the reductions must be surplus, permanent, quantifiable, and enforceable (U.S. EPA 1986):  
•  Surplus. To avoid double counting, the reductions must be additional to reductions required 
by state and federal regulations. If the purpose of the trades is to allow for flexible 
compliance, it must be shown that the trades do not end up increasing aggregate emissions. 
•  Permanent. The reductions must occur for as long as they are relied on in the state 
implementation plan (SIP) or SIP-related requirements. 
•  Quantifiable . The emissions reductions can be reliably measured. 
•  Enforceable. Violations can be identified and liability can be determined. State and/or 
federal agencies are able to apply penalties and secure appropriate corrective actions if 
necessary. 
If the above criteria are met, the emissions reductions are said to have “integrity”—that is, they do not 
result in emissions above what would occur in the absence of a trading program. 
3.3.a. Emissions Offsets  
Under the New Source Review provisions of the Clean Air Act, new large stationary sources in 
nonattainment areas (as well as existing sources that undergo major modifications) are required to 
implement lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER) technology. In addition, they must more than 
offset any increase in total emissions that results from their activity by securing emissions reduction 
credits from existing sources in the same area. For example, if a new power plant emitting 100 tons of 
NOx per year is built in a nonattainment area, it must secure more than 100 tons’ worth of ERCs to meet 
its offset requirements. Federal law specifies trading ratios for offsets that can be as high as 1:1.5, 
depending on source and nonattainment status. Thus, the firm in the example might be required to 
purchase ERCs equivalent to 150 tons of NOx emissions per year.  
The idea behind offsets is to enable economic growth without jeopardizing progress toward 
attainment of air quality goals. However, new sources are required to comply with stringent technology 
standards before purchasing credits from elsewhere, and therefore the compliance flexibility advantage 
of trading is weakened. Offsets are available for a variety of pollutants, most prominently NOx and 
VOCs.  
Swift and Haites (2002) conclude that the use of ERCs for offset purposes has comparatively 
high environmental integrity because of the “semicapped” nature of emissions from large stationary 
sources in nonattainment areas. As long as ERCs are generated within the stationary sector (as has been 
typically the case), New Source Review rules work to produce an implied cap on large stationary source 
emissions.  Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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3.3.b. Open-Market Trading  
In recent years, some states have attempted to expand emissions trading through “open-market” 
trading programs.
12 These programs were developed after in 1994 EPA released its proposed open-
market trading rule, which provided a framework for expanding emissions trading beyond electric 
utilities and other large stationary sources. This rule was never finalized, but elements of it were 
incorporated into EPA’s guidance for economic incentive programs, released in 2000. The open-market 
trading programs rely on discrete emissions reductions—mass-based, one-time reductions in emissions 
of pollutants (usually NOx or VOCs). DER credits are defined retrospectively, after the reductions have 
taken place. Whereas ERCs are necessarily a stream of reductions, DERs are usually created from 
activities of limited duration. An example of a DER is the reduction of NOx emissions that would occur 
when a coal-fired cogeneration plant switches its fuel to natural gas. The estimated reduction could then 
be banked and used or traded at a later date. According to EPA guidance, shutdowns and activity 
curtailment are not approved methods for generating DERs; rather, DERs are generally created from 
over-compliance with existing regulation and represent a reduction from an estimated baseline level of 
emissions. 
The most significant difference between open-market and offset trading is the use of the credits. 
DERs are designed to be used where there is no offset requirement, such as for compliance with EPA’s 
RACT standards, which apply to all large stationary sources in non-attainment areas, or for dealing with 
state penalties and special circumstances.  
The rationale for open-market programs has been to expand emissions trading beyond the 
traditional constituency of large stationary sources and to provide a vehicle for inter-sector trading, 
which many believe will open up new possibilities for cost savings. However, an open market does not 
have the firm emissions cap generally associated with allowance trading or even the implicit cap 
associated with New Source Review offsets. Because the open-market framework is explicitly designed 
for inter-sector trading and for uses other than the strict federal new source requirements, there is a 
higher risk that trades will lack integrity. For many types of sources often included in open-market 
programs (such as area or mobile sources), there is no meaningful inventory of the covered sources or 
reliable mechanism to monitor emissions at those sources. Thus, the universe of covered sources is not 
as well defined as it is for allowance trading or new sources in non-attainment areas. 
Swift and Haites’s (2002) survey of open-market programs contains several empirical findings 
concerning the performance of the programs. First, the authors find that there has been insignificant 
trading activity; credit generation far outweighs use, resulting in an oversupply of DERs. Second, 
although the primary focus of DER programs was initially permit compliance, almost half the uses of 
DERs have been for penalties and special circumstances. The use of DERs for permit compliance has 
been less than 1% of stationary NOx emissions. Finally, in most states, more than 90% of the NOx DERs 
have been created at a handful of large stationary sources. Swift and Haites conclude that open-market 
programs suffer from inherently weak environmental integrity unless certain best practices are 
instituted. 
3.4  Emissions Trading with Mobile Source Credits 
Although emissions reduction credits and discrete emissions reduction credits are 
predominantly created by stationary sources, trades involving mobile sources are permitted under 
federal law. EPA has allowed mobile source emissions reductions to be a source of tradable credits 
since 1986. According to EPA’s (1993) Interim Guidance on the Generation of Mobile Source Emission 
Reduction Credits, mobile emissions reduction credits (MERCs) can be used to comply with RACT 
standards, to offset emissions under New Source Review, to address temporary emissions spikes or 
temporary noncompliance with regulations, and to satisfy emissions reduction requirements that are 
                                                 
12 Texas, New Hampshire, Michigan, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Massachusetts all have programs, though New 
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over and above RACT. But MERCs cannot be used to satisfy the requirements of best available control 
technology, lowest achievable emissions rate, or new source performance standards. Furthermore, the 
guidance prohibits the use of MERCs for inspection and maintenance programs and employer trip 
reduction programs.
13 The guidance does not address implementation issues in much detail, in particular 
how MERCs would be used by stationary sources.  
MERCs can be generated from a range of actions, including vehicle scrappage programs, 
modifications of vehicle fleets, inspection and maintenance programs in areas where they are not 
required, clean fuel programs, and trip reduction measures. The orientation has been toward using 
technological approaches to create MERCs rather than relying on VMT reduction strategies. Scrappage, 
engine retrofit, and clean fleet programs are the most common methods for creating MERCs. 
In practice, MERC trading has been very limited. Although some states have provisions for 
including mobile sources in their offset programs, only a few—Connecticut, New Jersey, Michigan, and 
three air districts in California—have approved the creation of mobile emissions reduction credits. In 
those states, MERC trades have accounted for a tiny fraction of the emissions trades that have taken 
place. For example, according to Haites and Haider’s (1998) review, MERCs have been involved in less 
than 1% of the offset trades in California. The most significant current MERC project in California 
created offsets for PG&E National Energy Group’s Otay Mesa Generating Project in San Diego County. 
The offsets were generated from the conversion of diesel-fueled trash trucks to compressed natural gas, 
and the conversion of ferries to clean diesel technology (Diesel Technology Forum 2003). Houston has 
had a MERC program but is only now preparing to authorize the creation of its first MERC, involving a 
marine source. Several states allow credits to be created through trip reduction activities, but no MERCs 
have yet been created this way.  
Possible reasons for the limited use of MERCs include (1) the inherent difficulty of applying 
emissions trading to a sector with large numbers of relatively low-emitting sources. Because potential 
emissions reductions from any individual vehicle are relatively small, the costs of monitoring and 
certifying individual emissions reductions will tend to dwarf the potential value of the credit generated. 
Another important reason (2) is a mismatch between the nature of mobile source credits and the needs 
of credit buyers. By their nature, mobile source emissions reductions are temporary. For this reason, 
states and air districts have required that MERCs be considered temporary. Firms requiring offsets, on 
the other hand, must take steps to reduce emissions indefinitely. Finally, one more reason (3) lies in 
problems of demonstrating that MERCs meet EPA’s criteria for integrity. Of the integrity criteria, the 
requirements that reductions be quantifiable and surplus present the biggest challenge for mobile source 
reductions. It is more difficult to quantify emissions reductions from many mobile sources than those 
from a few large stationary sources. Stationary source emissions can be directly monitored, thus 
providing a high degree of assurance that reductions are actually occurring. There exists no 
corresponding monitoring regime for automobiles, and MERC programs frequently rely on emissions 
factor approaches rather than on monitored emissions.
14 
There are other potential uses for credits generated from telecommuting besides interfirm 
trading programs of the sort discussed above. The most obvious regulatory uses are for achieving 
compliance with rideshare programs, helping demonstrate transportation conformity, and contributing to 
voluntary mobile source emissions reduction programs (VMEPs) in the SIP. 
4. Ecommute program 
In 1999, Congress passed the National Air Quality and Telecommuting Act.  This Act 
established pilot telecommuting programs in five major U.S. metropolitan areas with the purpose of 
studying the feasibility of addressing air quality concerns through teleworking.  A group of key 
                                                 
13 At one time, employer trip reduction programs were mandatory for severe non-attainment areas, but Congress 
rescinded that requirement in 1995. Some areas still have those programs. 
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stakeholders outlined several important goals and objectives to be achieved in the program, including 
the following:   
 
•  ascertaining the viability of developing, testing and promoting economic incentives, specifically 
including emissions credits that may be tradable; 
•  building partnerships within U.S. communities to address air quality, congestion and quality of 
life issues associated with teleworking; 
•  defining and sharpening regulatory and statutory issues necessary to promote air emissions 
trading incentives, including mechanisms for cross-sector emissions trading; 
•  developing and evaluating methods for calculating reductions in emissions of precursors of 
ground level ozone and greenhouse gases achieved as the result of vehicle miles traveled; and 
•  gathering important data and information about transportation, urban planning, and the 
environmental impacts of telework. 
 
The original five metropolitan areas in the program were Chicago, the District of Columbia, 
Houston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.  Chicago dropped out of the program in 2000 and was replaced 
by Denver.  The “ecommute” program commenced in June 2001 and by March 2004, 49 companies 
with 535 employees had participated.  
The collection of data on teleworking activity in the ecommute program, as well as information 
on other commuting modes, is done using Teletrips, a web-based commute-tracking software developed 
by the Canadian-based firm, Teletrips Inc.  The software was designed specifically to track the emission 
benefits from telecommuting and other “green” commute alternatives (such as carpooling and biking).  
Participating employees fill out a form at the end of each week indicating for each day whether or not 
they went to work and their means of travel.  The interface is designed to be user-friendly and 
participants report that the weekly log can be filled out in under a minute.  Reporting is prompted by 
weekly e-mail reminders. 
Upon entering the program, each employee provides information about their vehicle and their 
commute. Information about the employee’s vehicle includes the year, make, and model of the vehicle, 
the engine type, and whether or not it has passed an emissions test.  Commute information includes the 
distance of the journey to work, as well as the time that the employee leaves home, arrives at work, and 
leaves work, arrives at home.  The employee reports his mode choice for each day, including driving 
alone to work, carpooling, using public transit, walking, biking, telecommuting at home, or 
telecommuting at a telework center.  The employee also reports if he does not work on that particular 
day.   
Teletrips is not a full-fledged trip diary, and therefore it does not capture the total travel 
behavior of individuals who telecommute.  For example, it is impossible to determine from the data if 
individuals drive more for non-work purposes on their telecommuting days, thus offsetting some of the 
benefits associated with not driving to work.  Furthermore, detailed information about the employees 
enrolled in Teletrips is not available. So, for example, we do not know the income, marital status, 
education, and so forth of these workers.  We also do not have reliable information on the types of jobs 
in which these workers are employed, their length of employment, or other job status information.   
Another factor limiting the scope of conclusions that can be drawn from the Teletrips data is the 
self-selected nature of the sample.  Self-selection occurs on two levels.  First, the decision to participate 
in the program is made at the firm level, so the sample is limited to those firms that have an interest in 
telecommuting and who happened to be contacted by the local organizations responsible for marketing 
the program.  Second, even within those firms, only employees who are interested in telecommuting 
sign up.  Therefore, information is collected about only those employees who are most likely to 
participate in a telecommuting-tracking program like ecommute.  Unfortunately, this data set does not 
provide a suitable “control” group that would allow more general questions about telecommuting 
behavior to be answered.   Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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On the other hand, the data gathered in the ecommute program has some distinctive features that 
can shed light on important questions concerning teleworking activity. The weekly commute log 
combined with the commute profile enables relatively accurate estimates of the emission benefits from 
telecommuting and other “green” commute options.  Because information on commute-length and 
vehicle type is specific to each participant, there is no need to rely on default averages, which might 
overstate or understate the emissions savings from individual telecommuting behavior.  Moreover, 
because trip activity is recorded more or less contemporaneously, the reported level of telecommuting 
may be more accurate than estimates obtained from one-time surveys.  An additional advantage of the 
data is that by following individuals through the life of the program, Teletrips allows for a detailed 
examination of how program participation and telecommuting behavior change over time.  Teletrips 
provides one of the few sources of information on teleworking behavior over time. 
5. Program Results 
5.1 Basic Information from Teletrips 
  We obtained the Teletrips data in March 2004, thus the most recent employee entries are for the 
last day of February.  Table 1 shows the total number of companies that have joined the ecommute 
program since it began in June 2001, the total number of employees enrolled, and the average number of 
employees per company.  It is important to understand that the 535 total employees enrolled across all 
cities includes all employees currently in the system, as well as those who were in the system at one 
time and then, for one reason or another, stopped reporting. Similarly, of the 49 registered companies, 
some may have dropped out of the program and some are current. 
  Denver has had the most active ecommute program of the five cities, with 252 employees 
enrolled across 13 companies. Los Angeles has as many companies signed up as Denver but far fewer 
employees per company. Likewise, Washington, DC, has several companies but not very many 
employees in each. 
 
Table 1.  Number of Companies and Number of Individual Employees Enrolled in the ecommute 
Program, by City 
as of March 1, 2004 
 Number  of  companies  Number  of  employees  Average number of 
employees per company 
Washington, DC  11  52  4.7 
Denver 13  252  19.4 
Houston 7  108  15.4 
Los Angeles  13  31  2.4 
Philadelphia 5 92  18.4 
    TOTAL  49  535  10.9 
 
As explained above, not all employees have been in the ecommute program since it began, and 
not all who started have remained in the program – or at least have continued to fill out a weekly 
commute log.  Moreover, even those who have been in the system for a significant period of time do not 
all reliably report their commute choices each week.  In the next three tables, we present some summary 
information on the lengths of time employees have been in the program, drop-out rates, and reporting 
frequency.  
   Table 2 shows the number of employees enrolled less than 3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 months, 
and a year or more.  These figures are generated by counting the number of days between the first date 
the employee reported to the system and the last date of reporting (as of March 1, 2004).  Thus, an 
employee may have gaps in his commute log, but we do not consider that dropping out of the program. 
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numbers vary significantly across the cities, however.  Denver has been active in registering companies 
and encouraging employee participation since the program began, thus 134 people in Denver have been 
in the program a year or more. Denver also continues to sign up new participants, as can been seen in 
the other time period categories in the table.  Virtually all participants in Los Angeles, on the other 
hand, have been in less than 3 months. Sixty percent of employees in the D.C. area have been in 6 
months or less. 
 
Table 2.  Length of Time Employees Have Been Enrolled in the ecommute 
Program, by City 
as of March 1, 2004 
 
  Number of employees enrolled 






Washington,  DC  18  13 4 17  52 
Denver  63 24 31  134  252 
Houston  13 8  6 81  108 
Los  Angeles  23  3 4 1  31 
Philadelphia  15  27 7 43  92 
    TOTAL  132  75  52  276  535 
 
In Table 3, we show how often employees report to the system.  On average, across all five cities, 
employees fill out their commute logs 71% of the time.  This means that they are failing to fill out the 
logs 29% of the time. This non-reporting is highest in Houston, where employees fill out their logs just a 
little over half the time, and is lowest in Los Angeles.  These percentages are averages; there are some 
employees who are more conscientious than others.  One hundred people in the Teletrips database have 
commute logs for every day that they have been in the system.
15  
Table 3.  Employee Reporting Frequency in the ecommute Program, by City 
as of March 1, 2004 
  Average Number of Days that Employees Fill Out a 
Commute Log as a Percent of Days in the Program 
Washington, DC  72.7 
Denver 76.5 
Houston 51.7 
Los Angeles  82.5 
Philadelphia 74.0 
    TOTAL  71.0 
 
  It is impossible to know from the data why people are not filling out their commute logs.  Even 
if they are on vacation, they are meant to fill the log out, stating that they did not work on the particular 
days in question.  Likewise, if they worked but did not telecommute, they are still supposed to log their 
commute activities.  In fact, there are over 100 people in the system who report that they have never 
telecommuted but who fill out their commute logs.  Nonetheless, we have to acknowledge the 
possibility that employees may be failing to report during the weeks that they do not telecommute, 
biasing the telecommuting results from the program. 
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Another issue with the data has to do with dropping out of the program. A large percentage of 
employees stop reporting after some period of time. It is possible that they are still teleworking, but 
because we have no commute logs for them, we have no way of knowing.  Table 6 shows the 
percentage of total employees enrolled in the program over the entire program period who have not 
reported to Teletrips within the last month for which we have data, February 2004. Overall, slightly less 
than 35% of all employees are currently reporting, thus 65% of the sample have dropped out, or at least 
have not reported to Teletrips for a month.  The percentages vary across the cities from only 42% in 
L.A. up to 73% in Philadelphia.  It is not surprising that L.A.’s drop-out rate is lowest since most of the 
employees enrolled there have signed up only late during the ecommute program. 
Tables 3 and 4 provide some useful information about tracking commute behavior over time.  
Even though Teletrips is reportedly easy to deal with and filling out commute logs takes very little time, 
there is still a high percentage of participants in the program who do not report on any given day and a 
very high percentage who appear to drop out completely.  As we said in Section II above, one of the 
unique aspects of this data was the possibility it provided of observing telecommuting behavior over 
time.  However, these observations need to be taken with a grain of salt because of the missing commute 
logs and limited time that some employees actively participate in the program. 
Table 4.  Employee Drop-Out Rates in the ecommute Program, by City 
 
  Percentage of Registered Employees Who Have Not 
Reported to Teletrips in the Most Recent Month, 
February 2004 
Washington, DC  71.2 
Denver 62.3 
Houston 70.4 
Los Angeles  41.9 
Philadelphia 72.8 
    TOTAL  65.4 
5.2.   Commute Mode Choice of Employees in the ecommute Program  
  For each day of the week, employees report not only their telecommuting activity but also their 
mode for commuting to work when they don’t telework and/or whether they did not work at all.  Table 5 
shows, for each pilot city, the percentage of total days worked that are teleworking days (including 
telework centers), as well as days in which the employee drove alone to work (including motorcycles), 
drove or rode in a car or van pool, used public transit, or used other forms of transportation (which 
includes bicycling and walking, as well as a self-reported “other” category).  The figures in Table 5 are 
calculated by simply adding up the days reported for each mode, across all employees, and dividing by 
the total number of days reported.  Thus the reporting days are treated as equivalent regardless of who is 
reporting – i.e., we do not take into account which employee is reporting.  Because employees enter and 
leave – or at least stop reporting to – the program on different dates and report with varying degrees of 
regularity, we have an unequal number of commute logs across employees.  There is no single correct 
way to summarize the commuting data in this case, so we choose to present it in two different ways.  In 
this section, we treat each day as equivalent to every other day, regardless of which employee filled out 
the log.  In the next section, we compute the percentage of days in the system that each employee 
teleworks and uses each mode to get to work.  We thus treat employees as equivalent but control for the 
fact that there are different numbers of days reported per employee by looking at percentages of days in 
the system.   
Table 5 shows that, on average, across all five cities, approximately 36% of total workdays 
reported to the system are telework days. The rest of the time, employees reported most often that they 
drove alone to work; this option accounts for 49% of all workdays.  The figures in Table 5 highlight the 
self-selection issue with this data that we mentioned in Section II above.  Participants in the program are Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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those employees who chose to sign up, and they are likely to be people who want to, and are able to, 
telecommute relatively often – just under 2 days per week, on average.  We have no information on the 
general, non-telecommuting, workforce. Another problem that may come into play, and one that we 
mentioned above, is that people may be reporting more faithfully during the weeks in which they have 
some telecommuting and not reporting in other weeks.  This could bias the mode choice percentages 
and in particular, raise the percentage of workdays that are telecommuting days above what it actually 
is.  
Table 5. Mode Choice of Employees in the ecommute Program on All Workdays, By City 
As of March 1, 2004 
  Percentage of Total Workdays Reported That are Days  














Washington, DC  55.4  3.3  1.9  3.7  35.7 
Denver 46.8  7.9  3.1  3.9  38.3 
Houston 62.9  9.2  2.4  7.2  18.3 
Los  Angeles  39.3 2.2 17.4  6.0  35.0 
Philadelphia 39.5  1.3  7.3  2.0 50.0 
ALL CITIES  49.0  6.6  3.8  4.2  36.4 
1The drove-alone option includes motorcycles. 
2The other category includes a self-reported “other” option as well as walking, bicycling, and roller-blading. 
3Telework includes working at home and working at a telework center.  Very few employees reported using a 
telework center. 
 
The figures vary in some rather surprising ways across the cities.  Los Angeles, the land of the 
automobile, has the lowest percentage of days in which employees drove to work alone and by far the 
highest percentage using public transit – over 17% of the time, employees in L.A. reportedly use transit.  
By contrast, in Philadelphia, transit is used only 7.3% of the time.  Houston has the lowest reported 
telework days in the system at 18.3%.  That city also has the highest “drove alone” percentage and the 
highest reported carpool and vanpool use.   
It is also interesting to look at these same percentages for non-telework days.  In other words, 
on the days that the employee worked but did not telecommute, what does he report as his commute 
mode?  Table 8 shows the findings in the data. If all employees who telecommute would otherwise have 
driven alone to work – a typical assumption made in many studies when looking at the congestion and 
emission benefits from telecommuting – we would expect that the percentages in the first column of 
Table 6 would be roughly equal to the sum of the first and last columns of Table 5.  In other words, the 
percentages attributable to teleworking in Table 5 would now be included in the “drove alone” option.  
This is not the case, however.  Instead, the percentages for all modes rise. We will return to this point 
when we discuss the emissions reductions from the ecommute program in Section 5.3 below.  Across all 
five cities, driving alone takes place on 77% of reported workdays when employees do not 
telecommute; transit accounts for 6% of all non-telecommuting workdays, and car and vanpools 
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Table 6. Mode Choice of Employees in the ecommute Program, on All Non-Telecommuting 
Workdays, by City 
As of March 1, 2004 












Washington,  DC  86.3  5.1 2.9 5.8 
Denver 75.9  12.7  5.0  6.4 
Houston 77.0  11.3  2.9  8.8 
Los  Angeles  60.5 3.4 26.8 9.3 
Philadelphia  78.9 2.7 14.5 3.9 
ALL CITIES  77.0  10.4  6.0  6.6 
1The drove-alone option includes motorcycles. 
2The other category includes a self-reported “other” option as well as walking, bicycling, and roller-blading. 
 
We can compare the figures in Tables 5 and 6 with mode choice numbers from other sources. 
Table 7 shows estimates for the year 2000 from the Federal Highway Administration’s Journey to Work 
survey for the five ecommute cities.
16  This is a broad survey across employees, some with access to 
telecommuting options but many more without.  Thus, compared with employees in the ecommute 
program, we would expect far fewer respondents to report working at home.  The last column of Table 7 
confirms this expectation.  Thus, it is probably best to compare the percentages in Table 7 with those in 
Table 6, the mode share figures on non-telecommuting days. The “drove alone” percentages in the 
ecommute program for Denver and Houston are almost identical to those obtained from the Journey to 
Work survey; Philadelphia’s “drove alone” percentage is also quite close.  The figures for Washington, 
DC, and Los Angeles, however, differ significantly.  In Washington, far more employees in the 
ecommute program report driving alone and far fewer use public transit than in the large sample 
surveyed in the "Journey to Work" study. This is likely due to the fact that the companies enrolled in the 
ecommute program are primarily suburban Northern Virginia companies and not D.C. firms with ready 
access to Metro.  The Los Angeles results, as expected, do not match the Journey to Work findings at 
all.  Less than 5% of people in L.A. use transit and nearly 73% drive alone to work, according to the 
Journey to Work, but in the ecommute program those percentages, on non-telecommuting days, are 27% 
and 60%, respectively. 
 
Table 7. Commute Mode Choice, from 2000 Journey to Work Survey, by CMSA 
 
  Average Number of Survey Respondents Who Report that They Use Each 















Washington, DC  70.8  12.8  9.2  3.8  3.5 
Denver 75.8  11.5  4.3  3.7  4.7 
Houston 77.3  14.2  3.2  2.9  2.5 
                                                 
16 The areas covered in the FHWA study are Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) that include a 
broader geographical area than the ecommute program. Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
  17
Los Angeles  72.7  15.2  4.6  4.0  3.6 
Philadelphia 73.5  10.3  8.6  4.8 2.8 
1The drove-alone option includes motorcycles. 
2The other category includes a self-reported “other” option as well as walking and bicycling. 
3This survey uses the term “work at home” rather than teleworking or telecommuting. 
 
  In Table 8 below, we summarize the ecommute mode choice and telework data in a slightly 
different way.  We calculate the proportion of days that each employee telecommutes, drives alone to 
work, and so forth, and then report averages across employees.  So although employees have different 
numbers of days reported, we make employees comparable by looking at the proportion of their days in 
the system that they undertake each activity.  In Table 8, we show only the drove alone, transit, and 
telecommuting options. 
The telework percentage across all five cities is roughly the same as it was in Table 5:  on 
average, employees have telecommuted 35% of the days that they have worked and reported to 
Teletrips.  The percentages for the individual cities are also comparable to those in Table 5, with the 
exception of Washington, DC.  According to Table 5, 36% of the total days reported in DC are 
telecommuting days but according to Table 7, the average employee has telecommuted only 22% of his 
workdays.  This must mean that there are a few heavy teleworkers in the DC area who have been with 
the program for a while, or at least reported to Teletrips relatively more than have others in that region. 
This brings up the average in Table 5 relative to Table 8.  Similarly, the “drove alone” percentage for 
DC is lower in Table 5 than in Table 8.  In both Tables 5 and 8, the percentage of workdays 
telecommuted in Philadelphia is quite high, 50.8% in Table 8.  This high number appears to be primarily 
a result of a set of 17 employees at Amtrak who report that they telework nearly every day. 
Table 8. Average Number of Days Employees in the ecommute Program 
Used Each Commute Mode, as Percentage of Total Work Days 
As of March 1, 2004 
 
 
1Drove alone option includes motorcycles. 
 
2Teleworked includes telework centers, as well as working at home. 
5.3.   Estimates of Emissions Reductions from the ecommute Program 
As we explained in Section 4 above, participants in the ecommute program report the age, make, 
and model of the vehicle in which they commute each day, as well as the distance traveled to and from 
work.  This means that, armed with emissions factors by vehicle age for each individual city, we can 
compute a fairly reliable estimate of the emissions avoided by telecommuting, on an individual 
employee basis.  We obtain these emissions factors, in grams per mile, from runs of EPA’s MOBILE 
model for four of the five cities and from runs of California’s EMFAC2002 model for Los Angeles.  
Both models have very detailed emission factors, specific to both vehicle type (passenger car, 
motorcycle, large and small trucks, etc.) and vehicle age.  Vehicle age is a crucial piece of information 








Washington, DC  62.3  3.4  21.9 
Denver 47.2  3.4  38.6 
Houston 63.5  1.4  17.9 
Los Angeles  45.2  12.5  32.4 
Philadelphia 33.9  11.4  50.8 
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dramatically reduced the emission rates of new cars over the past 20 years.  As a result, the emissions 
savings from averting a vehicle trip of a new car are much lower than the savings of averting a trip using 
an old car. 
Table 9 begins by showing the average one-way distances commuted from home to office.  The 
average one-way distance traveled by employees in the ecommute program is just over 22 miles.  Not 
surprisingly, Los Angeles has the highest average commute length at nearly 34 miles; Denver’s is the 
lowest at approximately 20 miles.  In each of the cities, however, the range is wide.  Some employees 
report that they commute only a mile each way, while the longest one-way commute is 146 miles.
17  The 
mean is greater than the median in each of the cities because of these few participants with very long 
commutes. 
The average one-way distance of 22 miles appears somewhat high.  In a report on telecommuting 
and emissions trading and the potential of the ecommute program by the National Environmental Policy 
Institute (NEPI, 2000), estimates of average distance to and from work, net of miles traveled for non-
work trips during the day, were given for each of the five cities.  These averages are as follows:  19 
miles (DC), 15 miles (Denver), 27.5 (Houston), 16.5 (Los Angeles), and 12.5 (Philadelphia).  With the 
exception of Houston, these averages are all below the averages in the first column of Table 9.   
Table 9. Distribution of One-Way Distance Commuted by Participants in the ecommute Program, 
by City 
as of March 1, 2004 
(in miles) 
 Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Washington,  DC  24.1 20.0 21.2  3  115 
Denver  19.7 15.0 14.7  1  85 
Houston  22.3 16.5 19.5  1  146 
Los  Angeles  33.6 30.0 20.6  5  80 
Philadelphia  25.3 20.0 19.2  1  100 
    ALL CITIES  22.4  17.0  17.9  1  146 
 
    An analysis of a telecommuting survey done by the Southern California Association of 
Governments (SCAG) shows that the average commuting distance of a teleworker is 21 miles in Los 
Angeles and the surrounding region. The SCAG number is useful as a comparison since it is an average 
only of people who telecommute and not the general population.  The Houston figure in Table 14 is 
reasonably close to the NEPI estimate: the average one-way distance for participants in the ecommute 
program is 22 miles, while the NEPI report estimates a distance of 27.5 miles.  The medians reported in 
Table 9 are actually closer to the averages reported by NEPI, at least the median distances in Denver 
and Washington, DC, match up well.  Again, the relatively few participants in the ecommute program 
who live a long way from their workplace appear to be driving up the means in Table 9. 
Tables 10 and 11 show the distribution of vehicle types and ages among the 535 employees in 
the ecommute program.  Table 10 shows that most employees, 67%, own light-duty gasoline vehicles.  
The next highest percentage is mid-size trucks at nearly 18%, followed by full-size trucks (>8,500 
pounds) at 7.5%.  Table 11 indicates that most of the employees in the ecommute program own 
relatively new vehicles.  Only 5.6% of the vehicles in use by ecommuters are pre-1990 vehicles.  Fully 
41%, on the other hand, are model year 2000 or newer.  The average vehicle is 5.4-years-old.
18 
                                                 
17 The distances were missing or erroneously reported as zero for a few employees in the dataset.  When we had 
the zip codes available, which we did in most cases, we looked up on the Internet distances between zip codes. 
18 This is actually an overestimate of vehicle age.  We calculated this figure by subtracting the vehicle model year 
for each employee from 2003 and then computing the average age.  However, some participants were in the 
program prior to 2003 and dropped out (or stopped reporting), thus their vehicles were newer in those years than 
they were in 2003.  We do not adjust for this. Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the average car on the road in 2000 was 9-
years-old, nearly 4 ½ years older than the vehicles owned by participants in the ecommute program 
(U.S. FHWA, 2003).  This could be significant.  If telecommuters own newer – and thus cleaner – than 
average vehicles, the emissions benefits of telecommuting may not be that great. 
 
Table 10.  Distribution of Types of Vehicles Owned by Employees in ecommute Program 
as of March 1, 2004 
 
Vehicle type  Percentage of employees in  
ecommute program 
Light-duty gasoline vehicles 
    (i.e., passenger cars) 
67.5 
Light-duty gasoline trucks 
    (6,000-8,500 lbs gross vehicle weight) 
17.8 
Light-duty gasoline trucks 
    (>8,500 lbs gross vehicle weight 
7.5 
Light-duty gasoline trucks 
    (<6,000 lbs gross vehicle weight 
5.2 
Motorcycles 0.9 
Light-duty diesel vehicles (i.e., passenger cars)  0.6 




Table 11.  Distribution of Ages of Vehicles Owned by Employees in ecommute 
Program 
as of March 1, 2004 
 
Vehicle Model Year  Percentage of employees in ecommute program 
1984 – 1989  5.6 
1990 – 1994  15.3 
1995 – 1999  37.8 
2000 & 2001  27.1 
2002 & 2003  14.0 
 
To generate specific emission factors for NOx and VOC for each city, we use the assumptions 
employed by local planners for their regulatory demonstrations.  This means that assumptions about 
temperatures, traffic congestion, inspection and maintenance programs, and the like are consistent with 
those used by the cities for purposes of demonstrating transportation conformity and other regulatory 
uses.  The scenario run for all cities except Denver was a Summer day in 2005.  For Denver a winter run 
was used because unlike the other cities Denver has a greater problem with carbon monoxide (which is 
worse in the winter) than ozone (which is worse in the summer).   
   Two important issues emerge for calculating total emissions reductions: (1) whether we assume 
that the employee would have driven alone to work had they not telecommuted, and (2) whether we 
assume that there is any change in non-work trips as a result of working at home.  Since we do not have 
any travel information on the individuals in the program other than their journeys to work, we cannot 
speak to (2).  We simply assume there is no change in non-work travel as a result of telecommuting.  
With respect to (1), we show emissions results under two assumptions.  In the first scenario, we assume 
that everyone who telecommuted would otherwise have driven alone to and from work in the vehicle 
they report that they own.  The emissions reduction from telecommuting is then the emissions factor, in Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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grams/mile, multiplied by the reported round-trip commute mileage from home to office.
19  In the 
second scenario, we use the information on mode choices that employees report to Teletrips and adjust 
this figure downward.  Specifically, for each employee the emissions reduction is the emissions factor, 
in grams per mile, multiplied by round-trip mileage multiplied by the percentage attributable to the 
“drove alone” option. This second scenario thus assumes that some of the telecommuting workers 
would otherwise have used public transit, walked or biked, or ridden in a car or vanpool.
20 
Table 12 shows total VOC and NOx emissions reductions for each city under the two mode 
choice assumptions.  Emissions reductions are greater under Scenario 1 because credit is taken for the 
full mileage from home to office (or telework center to office) on every day that the employee reports 
that she teleworks.  Thus emissions benefits shown in the first two columns are approximately 18% 
greater than those shown in the latter two columns.  Under both scenarios, Denver shows the greatest 
total emissions benefits because employees there have been in the program longer and thus report more 
days telecommuting.  Los Angeles shows the least benefit because of fewer employees who have 
enrolled later. Emissions reductions across all cities since inception of the program through February 
2004 total approximately 2 tons each of VOC and NOx. 
Table 13 provides more information by showing emissions reductions per telecommuting day – 
in other words, the numbers in Table 12 are divided by the total number of days of telecommuting for 
each city. 
Table 12.  Total Emissions Reductions from ecommute Program 







1Under Scenario 1, it is assumed that employees would have driven alone to work every telecommuting 
day had they not telecommuted. 
2Under Scenario 2, it is assumed that employees would have driven alone to work some fraction of the 
time based on reported mode choices. 
Table 13.  Emissions Reductions from ecommute Program, Per Telecommuting Day 
June 1, 2001 – Feb. 29, 2004 
(in pounds per day) 
                                                 
19 When the employee uses a telework center and reports the distance to the telework center, we account for that in 
our mileage calculations.  If the distance is unreported, which it was for approximately 50 employees, we multiply 
the reported home-to-office distance by the average ratio of the home-to-telework-center distance to home-to-
office distance, across employees, to obtain an estimate of the home-to-telework center distance.  
20 For those few employees who report that they telecommute every day, we have no information on what their 
mode choice would have been had they not telecommuted.  In these cases, we use the average “drove-alone” 
percentage for the rest of the sample, 77% (see Table 9 above), to adjust their emissions reductions. 
 Scenario  1
1  Scenario 2
2 
 VOCs  NOx  VOCs  NOx 
Washington,  DC  260 237 218 203 
Denver  2992 2319 2539 1981 
Houston  316 289 228 226 
Los  Angeles  49 24 39 19 
Philadelphia 907  1055  794  892 











1Scenarios as defined in Table 12. 
 
  Some interesting results show up in a comparison of Tables 12 and 13. The emissions 
reductions in Table 12 are strongly determined by the overall number of participants in the program.  
Thus, the emissions reductions in Philadelphia, in scenario 1, are more than 18 times the reductions in 
Los Angeles.  On a per telecommuting day basis, however, Table 13 shows that the two cities yield 
approximately the same emissions reduction.  This result is driven by the relatively high number of 
telecommuting days in Philadelphia, which is caused, in turn, by the fact that the average participant in 
the ecommute program in Philadelphia telecommutes a large percentage of his total workdays.  Denver, 
which has the largest total emissions reductions (Table 12) because of the large number of people 
enrolled, also has the largest reductions on a per telecommuting day basis as well (Table 13).  This 
result appears to primarily result from emissions factors.  The overall average emissions factors for 
VOC and NOx across all five cities are 1.308 g/mi and 1.109 g/mi, respectively.  In Denver, the averages 
are 1.530 g/mi (VOC) and 1.242 g/mi (NOx).  
In general, a combination of factors comes into play in Tables 12 and 13:  number of 
participants in the program, number of days each participant telecommutes, emissions factors of the 
vehicles owned by those participants, and distances traveled to work.  It is impossible to sort out all of 
the conflicting influences on emissions reductions and emission reductions per telecommuting day.   
Overall, across all the pilot cities, an average of slightly more than one-tenth of a pound each of VOC 
and NOx is reduced per day of teleworking.   
We can use these figures in Table 13 to calculate the number of teleworkers that would be 
needed to achieve a hypothetical target annual emissions reduction from telecommuting. Table 14 
shows the results of this calculation, assuming a target of 25 tons of VOCs.
21  Results in the first column 
are obtained assuming that each worker telecommutes the percentage of days given in Table 9.  These 
percentages range from 17.9% for Houston up to over 50% for Philadelphia, or slightly less than 1 day 
per week up to 2 ½ days per week.  Column 2 results are obtained using the average of 35% that holds 
across all cities. We also assume that there are 250 workdays in a year and that each worker would 
otherwise have driven alone to work on all of the days that he telecommuted (Scenario 1 in Tables 12 
and 13).  
To achieve the 25-ton target, Philadelphia would need 3,268 people to telecommute, assuming 
that each one telecommutes, on average, 50.8% of the time (see Table 9) – i.e., about 2 ½ days per 
week.  Denver’s number is roughly the same – 3290 – but those people would be telecommuting only 
38.6% of the time (see Table 9).  If we use the overall 5-city average of 35% for Philadelphia rather than 
the relatively high 50.8%, we find that many more people are needed to reach the target, approximately 
4,700.  In Houston, if telecommuters work at home only 18% of the time, as Table 9 showed, then 
nearly 10,500 telecommuters are needed to reach the VOC target.  If each telecommuter works at home 
35% of the time, however, only about half as many people are needed.  The two columns of the table 
simply highlight the trade-off that exists, for emissions reductions purposes, in number of people 
telecommuting and the frequency with which they do so.  
                                                 
21 We cannot simultaneously target both NOx and VOC so we just look at a scenario with a VOC target.  
Obviously, some NOx reductions will be achieved as well. 
 Scenario  1
1  Scenario 2
1 
 VOCs  NOx   VOCs  NOx  
Washington,  DC  0.139 0.126 0.116 0.108 
Denver  0.157 0.122 0.134 0.104 
Houston  0.107 0.097 0.077 0.076 
Los  Angeles  0.123 0.062 0.100 0.048 
Philadelphia  0.120 0.140 0.105 0.118 
ALL  CITIES  0.142 0.124 0.120 0.105 Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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1Using Scenario 1 – see Table 12 – and figures in Table 9 and assuming 250 workdays in a 
year. 
 
Using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures on employment during the 2001-2003 period for 
the five metropolitan areas in the ecommute program, the figures in the first column of Table 14 
represent the following percentage of total non-farm employment: 0.24% (Washington, DC), 0.30% 
(Denver), 0.50% (Houston), 0.13% (Los Angeles), and 0.14% (Philadelphia).
22  So assuming that each 
teleworker works at home anywhere from slightly less than 1 day per week up to 2 ½ days per week and 
assuming the average distances commuted and types of vehicles owned correspond to the figures in 
Tables 9, 10, and 11 – i.e., relatively long distances and relatively clean vehicles – between 0.14% and 
0.50% of the employed non-farm workforce in these metro areas must telecommute to generate a 25 ton 
per year reduction in VOC. 
As we have seen, the current institutional context has many barriers to trading telecommuting 
credits. If the regulatory situation becomes more hospitable, however, what is the potential for 
emissions trading with telecommuting credits? In this section, we present estimates for the potential 
credit value per teleworker, assuming no barriers to trading. The value of the emissions reductions per 
teleworker is based on two components: the reduction in emissions from telecommuting and the market 
price for emissions reduction credits. 
5.4. Emissions Reductions from Telecommuting  
The emissions benefits from telecommuting are often reported in aggregate terms—that is, total 
pounds of pollution avoided. This is fairly misleading because the category of pollutants includes things 
like carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide. But not all pounds of pollution are created equal. In 2002 
about 20 million tons of NOx was emitted in the United States, versus CO2 emissions of 5.8 billion tons. 
A number that aggregates the two pollutants is not meaningful. If pollution reductions from 
telecommuting are presented in aggregate terms, CO2 reductions will account for more than 90% of 
“total pollutants avoided.” Moreover, the two pollutants have very different impacts on the environment.  
The reductions in NOx and VOC emissions (the two pollutants that have the most active 
markets) from an avoided vehicle trip are fairly small. Cars today are far cleaner than they were even 10 
years ago, and this trend will continue, thanks to new vehicle and fuel standards. The upshot is that 
reducing a vehicle mile traveled does not deliver all that much in the way of pollution reduction.  
                                                 
22 Customized table on total non-farm employment created on BLS website.  See 
http://www.bls.gov/sae/home.htm.   
  Number of Teleworkers 
  Assuming % of days 
spent teleworking as in 
Table 9 
Assuming 35% of days 
spent teleworking 
Washington, DC  6,591  4,124 
Denver 3,290  3,628 
Houston 10,486  5,363 
Los Angeles  5,012  4,640 
Philadelphia 3,268  4,744 Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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Credit Values  
The other component of the emissions credit incentive is the value of the credit. In order to be 
able to realize the benefits of telecommuting, the holder of the credit should be able to sell credits on the 
market at a price higher than the incurred costs. Apparently, telecommuting is not the only source to 
produce such credits. In order to get some idea how valuable telecommuting credits can be, we consider 
six alternative programs. As one can imagine, credit values depend greatly on the specific conditions. 
We present values based on six scenarios: (1) current and predicted NOx allowance prices in regional 
cap-and-trade programs; (2) current and historical prices of DERs in various state programs; (3) a 
comparison with the costs of other on-road mobile source reductions; (4) the costs of MERCs used by 
firms to comply with southern California’s rideshare regulation; and (5) the price of NOx allowances in 
the RECLAIM program during the California electricity crisis, which represents a likely upper bound 
for the value of credits; and (6) the cost-effectiveness of other telecommuting programs
23. 
Given figures for the yearly emissions saving from telecommuting and the prices of credits, it is 
possible to estimate the revenue that a firm would generate per year per telecommuter. Table 15 
displays revenue estimates based on the range of NOx credit prices presented in the above scenarios and 
an emissions reduction of 10 pounds of NOx per year per telecommuter. Revenue can be as low as 1.50 
cents per year per telecommuter based on the low prices for DERs. Higher prices are found when credit 
prices are based on other mobile source strategies. The range of revenue is mainly between $40 and 
$100 per year per telecommuter. 
Table 15. Estimated Value of Emissions Reduction Credits  
per Teleworker per Year, $ 
  NOx credit prices  Revenue per teleworker per year 
Scenario  Low price  High price  Low revenue  High revenue 
NOx allowance prices   1,000  7,500  5.00  35.00 
DER prices  300  1,300  1.50  6.50 
Mobile source reductions  7,200  33,700  36.00  168.0 
Rideshare programs  8,000  19,000  40.00  95.00 
RECLAIM   15,000    75.00 
Other telework programs  16,250    81.26   
 
The potential revenue from telecommuting credits is part of the equation for evaluating whether 
emissions trading will promote telework on a large scale. The other piece of information is an 
understanding of how responsive telecommuting is to financial incentives. Unfortunately, there has been 
little experience with direct subsidies for telecommuting, and thus, how it responds to financial 
incentives is not well understood. 
Discussions with business leaders participating in the ecommute Business Roundtable produced 
estimates of about $500 to $1,000 per teleworker per year as an amount needed to prompt firms to 
implement formal telework programs. The proposed Teleworking Advancement Act sponsored by Sen. 
John Kerry of Massachusetts would give employers a tax credit of $500 for each employee participating 
in an employer-sponsored telework program.
24 If $500 per employee per year is indeed the sort of 
number necessary to get major increases in telecommuting activity, revenue from emissions trading is 
likely to fall short, even using high-end estimates for the future value of credits. However, as stated 
above, the responsiveness of telecommuting behavior to financial inducements is not well understood, 
                                                 
23 See Nelson (2004) for more details on the 6 hypothetical scenarios. 
24 Teleworking Advancement Act, S. 1856, 107th Congress, December 18, 2001. Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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and a lower dollar figure could conceivably be sufficient to promote large-scale increases in 
telecommuting. 
6. Conclusions 
  In this paper we analyzed the results of the ecommute program. The program conducted pilot 
projects in five US metropolitan areas to study the feasibility of trading mobile source emissions credits 
created from telecommuting.  
   
Mobile source emissions come from a large number of vehicles, each emitting a relatively small 
amount, and as a result the costs of monitoring and verifying the emissions will greatly cut into the 
efficiency benefits of an emissions trading regime. It is worth noting that in discussions about including 
the transport sector in carbon cap-and-trade regimes, the focus has been upstream, for either fuel 
producers or vehicle producers, rather than downstream, for drivers (Australian Bureau of Transport and 
Communications Economics 1998). The reason, of course, is the significant administrative burden 
associated with monitoring individual driving activity.  
EPA requires that any emissions trades demonstrate environmental integrity by showing that the 
reductions are surplus, permanent, quantifiable, and enforceable. In practice, the surplus requirement 
brings emissions trading of telecommuting credits into conflict with other claims on telecommuting, 
notably from local planning organizations seeking reductions in the transportation conformity process 
and regional transportation plans, and from state environmental agencies seeking compliance in their air 
quality plans.  
The quantification protocols for activity-based vehicle emissions reductions are not well 
developed and necessarily rely on a hypothetical baseline. Thus, the emissions reductions from 
telecommuting, even in a carefully designed program like ecommute, will remain speculative when 
compared with emissions reductions from continually monitored sources like power plants. 
Furthermore, the administrative burdens associated with making sure that firms aren’t cheating and 
claiming excess telecommuting are fairly high and might make the reductions difficult to enforce. 
The above issues could conceivably be overcome. For example, a cost-effective technology 
could emerge that would ease the monitoring of individual driving activity. Similarly, the Clean Air Act 
could be amended or interpreted differently to ease the integrity requirements as they apply to mobile 
sources and provide more latitude for trading of pollution credits generated from reduced driving 
(although whether such changes are worth the reduced certainty of the reductions will be a subject for 
debate).  
But the most intractable issue is probably economic—the low value of the credit revenue. The 
emissions reductions from a single avoided trip are not large. Given the range of estimates for the future 
value of pollution credits, it is hard to see the potential revenue to firms being large enough to induce 
large-scale changes in driving activity. It is possible that the low level of participation by employers in 
the ecommute pilot programs is an indicatiin that companies knew the credits had very low value. From 
the point of view of local planning organizations and state agencies looking to direct scarce public funds 
to emissions reduction activities, in the short and medium term there are far more cost-effective uses for 
the funds (if the measure is purely emissions reductions). This situation is likely to persist for the 
foreseeable future.  
The emissions characteristics of the vehicle fleet (particularly light-duty vehicles) are expected 
to improve dramatically over the next 20 years, making per trip emissions reductions from 
transportation demand management strategies still smaller. Figure 1 shows projected composite 
emissions factors for light-duty gasoline vehicles over the next 20 years. Paradoxically, improvements 
in vehicle technology will reduce the emissions benefits from each teleworked day.  This already 
showed up in the ecommute pilot programs where the data revealed that participants owned relatively 
new and clean vehicles. 
All of this is not to say that the government does not have any reason to promote 
telecommuting. A large-scale increase in telecommuting could produce welcome emissions benefits for Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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many highly polluted areas. Approaches that minimize transaction costs—wholesale approaches like 
public outreach programs and eliminating regulatory obstacles to teleworking—may be warranted, 
especially considering the other potential social benefits from telecommuting, most notably, congestion 
benefits. 
 










































Source: Authors’ calculations using MOBILE6 
 
The issue of climate change offers perhaps the most hospitable context for emissions trading. 
The environmental impacts of CO2 and most other greenhouse gas emissions are independent of where 
they occur. A ton of CO2 emitted in Los Angeles has essentially the same environmental effect as a ton 
emitted in Wyoming or India. The geographic scope of the market is much larger than for pollutants like 
NOx and hydrocarbons, which affect local and regional air quality. Thus, whereas the market for NOx, 
VOC, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter reductions from telecommuting will necessarily depend 
on local environmental and regulatory conditions in a nonattainment area, a firm wishing to sell carbon 
credits from telecommuting has a much larger potential market of buyers. 
Carbon emissions are not currently regulated in the United States, but as noted above, the 
European Union is preparing to implement a carbon trading regime in early 2005. The transport sector is 
currently excluded from this regime but may have to be included at some point if E.U. nations have 
difficulty meeting their targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Because the United States is not a signatory to 
the protocol, it is not possible to trade U.S.-generated credits in the European Union or Kyoto systems. 
Within the United States and Canada there are scattered voluntary trading programs, and several 
northeastern U.S. states are moving to a limited cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions; the level of the 
cap is not yet known, making it impossible to forecast allowance prices.  
The lack of a national and comprehensive policy on greenhouse gas emissions seriously limits 
the demand for reductions. Within U.S. voluntary trading programs, prices for CO2 credits and Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
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allowances have ranged between $0.50 and $2.50 per ton, and comparable prices have been seen in 
Canada’s trading programs, GERT and PERT (Zaborowski and Reamer 2004). To give some 
perspective, a price of $25 per ton of carbon translates into about an additional 6 cents per gallon of 
gasoline. 
The strongest argument for promoting telework may be the benefits for traffic congestion. In a 
recent review of studies on the social costs of driving, a Federal Highway Administration (2000b) report 
presents a figure of 7.7 cents per mile (2000 dollars) in external congestion costs from auto travel in 
urban areas. The same report places external air pollution costs in urban areas at 1.33 cents. In other 
words, a 10-mile automobile trip in an average urban area will generate 77 cents in external congestion 
costs and only 13 cents in external pollution costs. Along specific corridors, external congestion costs 
can be much higher. A recent study estimates that marginal congestion costs on the most crowded roads 
in the Washington, D.C., area are well over $1 a mile (Safirova and Gillingham 2004). 
Looking ahead, while cars are projected to get cleaner, all estimates show traffic congestion 
worsening. Vehicle miles traveled will continue to rise thanks to demographic factors, such as 
population growth, rising incomes, and a larger share of licensed drivers in the population. Many 
metropolitan areas are dealing with tight budgets and an inability to fund new road and transit 
infrastructure to keep pace with travel demand. Recent construction cost data suggest that average costs 
for providing additional peak-period capacity on urban freeways can run as much as $10 million per 
lane mile (Federal Highway Administration 2000b). State transportation agencies have a strong interest 
in delaying or averting costly road construction, and strategies like telecommuting may lessen the 
pressure for the investments by reducing vehicle trips. Therefore, transportation agencies and 
metropolitan planning agencies are likely to continue to pursue telecommuting, as one strategy among 
many, to reduce both traffic congestion and air pollution. 
References 
 
National Environmental Policy Institute (NEPI). 2000. The National Air Quality and Telecommuting Act (as Part 
of HR 2084): Final Report. NEPI: Washington, DC (July 31).  
Available at http://www.nepi.org/pubs/summary.pdf.  
NuStats, Inc. 2003.  2002 Telework Study, Draft Final Report. Austin, TX: NuStats (May 14). 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2004. http://www.bls.gov/sae/home.htm.   
U.S. Federal Highway Administration. 2003. Our Nation’s Highways 2000: Selected Facts and Figures.  U.S. 
FHWA Office of Highway Policy Information, Report No. FHWA-PL-01-1012.   
Available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/onh2p3.htm (Feb. 14). 
Air Daily. 2003. “Burbank Uses NOx Credits to Settle Clean Air Act Lawsuit.” Vol. 10, No. 064. April 4. 
Australian Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics. 1998. “Tradable Permits in Transport?” 
Working Paper 37. 
Burtraw, D., and K. Palmer. 2003. “The Paparazzi Take a Look at a Living Legend: The SO2 Cap-and-Trade 
Program for Power Plants in the United States.” RFF Discussion Paper 03-15. Washington, DC: Resources 
for the Future. 
Choo, Sangho, Patricia Mokhtarian, and Ilan Salomon. 2003.  “Does Telecommuting Reduce Vehicle-Miles-
Traveled? An Aggregate Time Series Analysis for the U.S.,” Paper presented at Transportation Research 
Board annual meeting, January.  
Clean Air Action Corporation. 2002. “US Experience with Emissions Trading. Prepared for the Domestic 
Emissions Trading Working Group”, Natural Resources Canada. 
Coase, R. 1960.”The Problem of Social Cost”. The Journal of Law and Economics, 3:1-44 
Collantes Gustavo O. and Patricia Mokhtarian. 2003. “Telecommuting and Residential Location: Relationships 
with Commute Distance Traveled for State of California Workers,” Institute of Transportation Studies 
Working Paper UCD-ITS-RR-03-16 (Davis, CA: University of California-Davis). 
 
Crocker, T.D. 1966.” The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems.” The Economics of Air 
Pollution. New York, W.W.Norton & Co.: 61-86 
Dales. 1968, J.H. 1968. Pollution, Property and Prices. Toronto, University of Toronto Press. Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
  27
Diesel Technology Forum. 2003. Cleaner Air Better Performance: Strategies for Upgrading and Modermnzing 
Diesel Engines. Frederick, MD. May. 
Drury, R.T., M.E. Belliveau, J.S. Kuhn, and S. Bansal. 1999. “Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los 
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy.” Duke Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 9: 231. 
Electric Utility Weekly. 2004. Platt Market Survey. June. 
Energy Information Administration. 2003. Analysis of S. 485, the Clear Skies Act of 2003 and S. 843, the Clear 
Planning Act of 2003. Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, U.S. Deparment of Energy, 
Washington, DC. September. 
Environmental Defense. 2001. “Open Market Trading: The Shortcomings of a Flawed Approach to Emissions 
Trading.” White Paper. New York: Environmental Defense. May. 
Federal Highway Administration. 2000a. Addendum to the 1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study. FHWA-
PL-00-021. Washington, DC. May. [can’t find in text; delete and change the 2000b cites to just 2000?] 
———. 2000b. Addendum to the 1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study. FHWA-PL-00-021. Washington, 
DC. May. 
———. 2002  “Transportation and Air Quality: Selected Facts and Figures.” Brochure. Washington, DC. 
Haites, E., and M. Haider. 1998. Experience with Mobile Source Emissions Trading and Its Potential Application 
to Greenhouse Gas Emissions by the Transportation Sector. Toronto: National Round Table on the 
Environment and the Economy. 
Henderson, Dennis and Patricia Mokhtarian. 1996. “Impacts of Center-Based Telecommuting on Travel and 
Emissions: Analysis of the Puget Sound Demonstration Project,” Transportation Research D 1(1): 29-45. 
Houston-Galveston Area Council (HGAC). 2000. Houston/Galveston Attainment Demonstration and Post-1999 
Rate-of-Progress SIP, Appendix K: H-GAC Documentation of VMEPs. December.  
Kitamura, Ryuichi, Patricia Mokhtarian, Ram Pendyala, and Konstadinos Goulias. 1991. “An Evaluation of 
Telecommuting as a Trip Reduction Measure,” University of California Transportation Center (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California), August. 
Koenig, Brett, Dennis Henderson, and Patricia Mokhtarian. 1996. “The Travel and Emissions Impacts of 
Telecommuting for the State of California Telecommuting Pilot Project,” Transportation Research C 4(1): 
13-32. 
Kruger, J., and W.A. Pizer. 2004. “The EU Emissions Trading Directive: Opportunities and Potential Pitfalls.” 
RFF Discussion Paper 04-24. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. 2004. “Severe Area SIP.” Appendix G: Emission Reductions 
from Transportation Control Measures, State Implementation Plan.  February. 
Mokhtarian, Patricia and Krishna Varma. 1998. “The Trade-Off Between Trips and Distance Traveled in 
Analyzing the Emissions Impacts of Center-Based Telecommuting,” Transportation Research D 3(6): 419-
28. 
Nelson, Peter 2004. “Emissions Trading with Telecommuting Credits:                                                                                               
Regulatory  Background and Institutional Barriers,” Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 
(November). 
Nilles, J. , F. Carson, P.Grey, G.Hanneman. The Telecommunications-Transportation Tradeoff, Wiley, New York, 
1976. 
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER). 2000. “Trading Thin Air.” White Paper. Washington, 
DC. June. 
Safirova, E. and K. Gillingham. 2003. “Measuring Marginal Congestion Costs of Urban Transportation: Do 
Networks Matter?” RFF Discussion Paper 03-56. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
South Coast Air Quality Management District. 2004. Final Socioeconomic Assessment for Proposed Amended 
Rule 2202—On-Road Motor Vehicle Mitigation Options. January. 2004. 
Stavins, R. 2001. “Experience with Market-Based Instruments.” DiscussionPaper 01-58. Washington, DC: 
Resources for the Future. 
Swift, B., and E. Haites. 2002. “Emission Reduction Credit Trading Systems: An Overview of Recent Results and 
an Assessment of Best Practices.” Research Report. Washington, DC: Environmental Law Institute. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1986. Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for 
Creating, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits: Final Policy Statement and Accompanying 
Technical Issues Document. 51 FR 43834. Washington, DC. 
———. 1993. Interim Guidance on the Generation of Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits. Washington, 
DC. Walls, Nelson, Safirova   Telecommuting and Environmental Policy 
  28
———. 1997. Guidance on Incorporating Voluntary Mobile Source Emission Reduction Programs in State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs). Washington, DC, 3. 
———. 2001a. The United States Experience with Economic Incentives for Protecting the Environment. EPA-
240-R-01-001. Washington, DC. 
———. 2001b. Improving Air Quality with Economic Incentive Programs. EPA-452/R-01-001. Washington, DC. 
———. 2003. The Clear Skies Act: Technical Support Package, Section C: Projected Costs. Washington, DC. 
July. 
Walls, Margaret and Peter Nelson. 2004. “Telecommuting and Emissions Reductions:  Evaluating Results from 
the E-Commute Program,” Discussion Paper  04-42. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future 
Zaborowski, P., and J. Reamer. 2004. “Reality Check for the U.S. GHG Market.” Evolution Markets Executive 
Brief. April 26. 
 